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Using the system dynamics methodology, we leverage 
extant research on digital platforms and Agile 
development from the information systems and 
strategic management literatures to create a dynamic 
framework for considering the effect of digital platform 
versioning under different levels of market dynamism. 
We find that the impact of platform versioning release 
cycle time (RCT) and the scope of platform updates on 
platform outcomes (number of packages available and 
number of downloads) depends on market dynamism, 
sensitivity of users’ utility to app breakage, and value 
of the platform’s core functionality to the developers. 
Among other results, we show that smaller, 
incremental updates of functionality are generally 
preferable to larger, radical updates, even in dynamic 
markets. In contrast, longer RCTs are preferred in less 
dynamic markets, while small to moderate RCTs are 
preferred in more dynamic markets. We conclude with 
an agenda for future research. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Platform owners rely on third-party developers, 
who build add-on complementary assets (e.g. 
applications) that increase platform functionality. 
Examples of these assets include mobile applications 
on the iOS app store or statistical packages on the R 
platform. Through leveraging the third-party 
developers’ complementary assets, platforms can offer 
value to users (e.g. [13, 8, 20]) without creating the 
functionality themselves.  
To facilitate developer participation, platform 
owners provide resources [17], such as APIs, SDKs, 
code libraries, and templates [13, 23], with which 
third-party developers create apps. Updates to a 
platform can attract third-party developers with the 
availability of new platform resources [13]. There is a 
growing literature examining the role of these 
resources.  However, not much has been done to 
understand the impact of platform updates on third-
party developers and on platform outcomes.  
 On the one hand, platform versioning through 
updates improves the platform's functionalities and 
architecture [24]. This is critical for third-party 
developers to continue enhancing their applications to 
create new functionality (e.g. [9]). On the other hand, 
certain type of platform updates come with costs for 
developers and users. For instance, radical updates that 
change some core functionality upon which third-party 
applications depend  cause application breakages [21]. 
This deteriorates the user experience and increases 
developers’ maintenance costs as the developers will 
have to update their apps to maintain compatibility 
with the platform [1]. The latter is particularly true 
when an app or a package in an open source context 
leverages exogenous codebases in other applications 
by third party developers. Reliance on exogenous 
codebases creates interdependencies between packages 
or apps.  For instance, Uber’s app relies on the Google 
Map API to access its database of maps. Thus, a 
platform update that affects the functional uses of 
Google Maps will increase the risk of the Uber app 
breaking.  
While scholars typically assume that platform 
resources are stable sets of standardized interfaces 
upon which third-party developers leverage app 
development (e.g. [12]), platform versioning 
challenges the assumed stability (e.g. [18, 21]). The 
findings about the impact of platform versioning on 
developers are conflicting; some find that frequent 
updates to the platform lead to inferior performance for 
third-party developers ([18, 21]), whereas others find 
the reverse, particularly if the apps have higher 
functional interdependencies with other apps [1]. 
Scholars are also silent on the implications of platform 
versioning for platform owners.  
As platforms evolve and compete with other 
platforms, there is a need to adapt platforms’ offerings 





for users and third party developers to ensure the 
incorporation of the newest functionalities. To that end, 
the Agile development scholars find that shorter sprints 
enable faster feedback loop from development efforts 
and improve development outcomes [e.g. 4]. Shorter 
sprints will also allow platform owners to keep up with 
the market dynamism [e.g. 10]. However, this raises 
important questions that, to the best of our knowledge, 
have not been addressed in the literature: What is the 
effect of the frequency and scope of platform 
versioning on platforms? How does the scope of 
platform updates (e.g. radical changes in core 
functionality or platform interfaces vs incremental 
updates) affect platforms? How do these effects change 
with market dynamism and developers’ use of 
exogenous code? The goal of this study is to question 
the conventionally perceived benefits of Agile 
development in the platform context by identifying 
boundary conditions that facilitate or inhibit platform 
package availability and downloads.   
We approach this question by developing a 
dynamic model rooted in extant research on digital 
platforms in the Information Systems and strategic 
management literatures. We use the model to run 
computational "experiments." Simulation is helpful for 
analyzing multiple interdependent processes operating 
simultaneously by extending experimental time 
horizons beyond the limited measurement periods in 
laboratory and field research. At the same time, we can 
examine the conditions influencing the developers’ 
decisions and outcomes and their implications for the 
platform, which are typically infeasible with qualitative 
interviews or archival data. This allows us to explicate 
the interdependencies between the outcomes and 
processes involved. In the following section, we briefly 
review the platform literature to understand how 
platform versioning impacts owners, developers, and 
users. We then describe our model specifications and 
the preliminary results of our computational 
experiments. Finally, we highlight the theoretical and 
managerial implications of this work.  
 
2. Conceptual background 
 
2.1. Impact of platform versioning on platform 
owners 
 
New platform resources created through platform 
versioning allow third-party developers to create more 
functionalities and provide more value (e.g., product 
heterogeneity) to the user, which, in turn, benefits the 
platform owner (e.g., the increased functional utility of 
the platform) [6]. Thus, third-party developers help 
maximize a platform owner’s value to users while 
minimizing the platform owner’s investment in 
development. For this reason, platform owners have to 
keep third-party developers motivated in order to 
ensure the platform ecosystem’s viability [23]. 
How this changes in a dynamic market is unclear. 
On the one hand, the work on Agile Development and 
dynamic capabilities suggest that firms need to work 
fast to co-evolve with the environment [10]. The idea 
underlying Agile Development methods, such as scrum 
or Extreme Programming, is that incremental and 
iterative design makes platform development faster, 
nimbler and more aligned to the needs of the users [4, 
5]. A shorter RCT (release cycle time) is thus rooted in 
the principles of iterative design.   
While Agile Development provides structure and 
speed in platform development, it may lead to 
incremental, and thus insufficient, improvements in 
platform functionalities, because of its focus on speed 
and iteration. The incremental platform updates may 
inhibit the development of innovative, disruptive 
solutions that third party developers may need to create 
packages for a dynamic environment. However, radical 
updates have their adverse effects as well. Frequent, 
radical changes of the core functionality in the 
platform can result in a platform that appears less 
stable than competing platforms [21, 27]. Platform 
updates that change functionalities and interfaces upon 
which developers rely on may create disincentives and 
costs for third-party developers such that they may stop 
developing for the platform [24], thus reducing the 
apps available on a platform.  
Overall, there is thus a gap in our understanding of 
the tradeoffs of speed and scope of platform versioning 
and its implications for platforms. It has not yet been 
elaborated in depth in the literature how to organize 
and optimize platform release cycles to improve 
package availability and number of downloads.  
 
2.2. Impact of platform versioning on third-
party developers 
 
Platform updates can reduce the development costs 
of new applications if they offer more functionality. 
Developers can also leverage “exogenous” codebases 
(i.e. reusing other existing applications) to support their 
own application functions [14, 15 26]. By reusing 
exogenous code, developers can further reduce their 
app development cost, increase development speed 
[26] and add more functionalities efficiently.  
However, frequent and radical platform versioning 
can introduce breaking changes or app malfunctions 
[1] for all apps. For example, many applications were 
not ready for iOS 11 when it was released. These 
updates required developers to significantly adapt or 
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reconfigure their apps to leverage functionality 
improvements (e.g. [26]). Thus, the scope and 
frequency of platform versioning can increase costs for 
developers. While certain updates like stability 
enhancements and security patches might not cause 
breakages or other issues for third-party developers, a 
radical update may reduce the accessibility of older 
apps and require developers to maintain backward 
compatibility [21], especially if the platform 
architecture is not designed in a way to facilitate 
integrability [19]. As a result, frequent radical updates 
can limit the resources available for new app 
development [3] particularly for applications with 
higher interdependencies with other apps. Developers 
may have to wait for other apps to be updated before 
they can update their apps with new platform versions 
[1]. The extant research does not explain the 
interdependencies between platform versioning and 
developers’ design choices and outcomes. 
 
2.3. Impact of platform versioning on users 
 
While the focus of this paper is on platform owners 
and developers, the scope and frequency of platform 
updates affects the users as well. Platform versioning 
can improve the platform’s user interface and can 
increase user interest through better availability of 
apps. Increased user interest in the platform further 
attracts developers and can lead to an even higher 
number of apps available on the platform, creating a 
virtuous circle [7, 20].  
However, frequent and more radical updates can 
result in usage interruptions or inconvenience for the 
users due to app breakages (e.g. [1, 21]). For example, 
Kapoor and Agarwal [18] noted that there were huge 
spikes in users searching for “iOS app not working” on 
the Google search engine during the months when the 
new platform version was launched. The challenges 
faced by the users include adapting to changes in the 
user interface [16] and a lack of backward 
compatibility. Developers with resource or capability 
constraints may not be able to adapt to the changes in 
platforms [7] quickly, which can discourage app use 
and result in users’ and developers’ departures from 
the platform [21]. 
 
3. The model 
 
We outline a number of assumptions used in the 
model, before delving into the casual loop diagram of 
the model and describing the different loops. Finally, 
we introduce some of the key equations of the model. 
 
3.1. Model assumptions 
  
1. Each simulation runs from an initial time of 0.0 
weeks to a final time of 250 weeks.  
2. We assume that the platform owner cares about 
the cumulative number of downloads and the 
functionality of the platform (proxied by the 
number of packages available). We use the term 
packages and apps synonymously.  
3. We assume that third-party developers care about 
the number of downloads, the platform’s core 
functionality, and development and maintenance 
costs of the applications on this platform.  
4. The release of new platform versions is assumed 
to be exogenous to the model, although, these 
decisions may be influenced by platform 
outcomes. Platform releases have several effects 
on developers and users:  
a.  Platform releases improve the platform’s core 
functionality. New platform versions may 
increase the scope of functions that developers 
can leverage, increasing the attractiveness of 
the platform for third-party developers.  
b.  Our model focuses on releases that change at 
least some property that third party developers 
rely on. As a result, following the release of a 
platform version, some packages break due to 
incompatibility. The rate of package breakage 
depends on the extent (scope) of platform 
update and the frequency of updates. Frequent 
(i.e. shorter release cycle time) and more 
radical platform updates lead to more 
packages breaking, which increases 
developers’ maintenance costs and reduces the 
attractiveness of the platform for developers. 
Moreover, package breakages reduce users’ 
utility from platform use. A lowered user 
interest also reduces the attractiveness of the 
platform for the developers.  
c. We assume that developers can use exogenous 
codebases.  The effect of platform updates on 
package breakage depends on the scope of the 
platform update, and the extent of exogenous 
codebases used in packages. A higher number 
of packages break if more packages rely on 
other packages for functionality. 
5. The increase in the number of packages has two 
contradictory effects on developers. The cost of 
development drops, as the number of packages on 
the platform increases, since new packages can 
take advantage of a wider range of exogenous 
codebases. Yet, the availability of many packages 
can create a crowding effect, making it harder for 
users to notice and download a package.  
6. Some packages lose relevance over time as market 
needs or tastes shift. Similarly, some resources 
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that make up the platform’s core functionality also 
lose relevance with time. The degree of market 
dynamism determines how fast packages or 
platform resources become obsolete.  In highly 
dynamic markets, the obsolescence rate is higher. 
 
 
Figure 1. Causal loop diagram 
 
 
Figure 2. Model structure 
 
3.2. Causal loop diagram 
  
 The casual loop diagram (Figure 1) illustrates the 
model’s assumptions and highlights the feedback 
processes that govern the model behavior. At the 
center of the model structure is a positive feedback 
loop of cross-side network effects. The release of new 
platform versions improves the platform’s core 
functionality, which makes the platform more 
attractive to third-party developers. The more 
attractive the platform is to developers, the higher the 
number of packages developed, which makes the 
platform more attractive to users. With increased user 
utility, more users download the platform and the 
packages, which further increases the attractiveness 
of the platform to developers, creating a positive 
feedback loop. Note that the degree of market 
dynamism affects the strength of this loop. In a more 
dynamic market with quickly shifting tastes and 
technologies, packages and platform resources lose 
relevance at a faster rate, diminishing the strength of 
the cross-side network effect.  
 As the number of packages increases, three more 
feedback loops are activated. First, package 
development time shortens with the wider availability 
of exogenous codebases that can be incorporated into 
a package. This improves the attractiveness of the 
platform for developers and stimulates more package 
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development, creating a positive feedback 
(leveraging exogenous codebases loop). However, as 
reliance on exogenous codebases increases, packages 
break more easily after a platform update since the 
exogenous codebases may also be broken during the 
platform update.  
 
 A higher package breakage rate means higher 
maintenance costs over time, which reduces the 
attractiveness of the platform for developers, creating 
a negative feedback (too much reliance on exogenous 
codebases loop). Note that a higher breakage rate 
also reduces the user utility, potentially turning the 
cross-side network effects loop from a virtuous circle 
to a vicious one.  
 Finally, as more and more packages are 
developed, the likelihood of a package to be 
downloaded by a user goes down due to a crowding 
effect. This crowding effect reduces the attractiveness 
of the platform for developers, creating another 
negative feedback (developer competition loop) that 
limits the growth of number of packages. 
 
3.3. Overview of the model structure 
 The model is built and validated following 
standard system dynamics methodology practices 
[11, 22]. An overview of the model is presented as a 
stock-flow diagram in Figure 2. Because of space 
limitations, only key model equations are described 
below.  
Number of Market Relevant Packages is a state 
variable (stock) that represents the number of 
packages (apps) developed for the platform that are 
still relevant to the market’s needs and tastes.  The 
higher the market dynamism fraction, the faster the 
packages lose relevance.  
Ind packages(t) is a proxy for developers’ interest in 
the platform given the current market conditions. It 1) 
increases with number of downloads of the platform 
(a proxy for user interest in packages), 2) increases 
with platform’s core functionality, 3) decreases with 
the platform package development cost, and 4) 
decreases with package maintenance cost.  
 
where fDownloads(t) is concave increasing in the 
Number of Downloads(t), fCoreFunctionality(t) is 
concave increasing in Platform Core Functionality(t), 
fDevCost(t) is convex decreasing in Package 
Development Cost(t) and fMaintenanceCost(t) is 
convex decreasing in Package Maintenance Cost(t).  
 
Number of Downloads is a state variable that 
represents the number of users that have adopted the 
platform. 
Similar to Ind packages(t), Ind Downloads(t) 
represents the number of users that would be willing 
to adopt the platform under the current conditions. 
Ind Downloads(t) increases with the number of 
market relevant packages and the standalone value of 
the platform, whereas it decreases by the rate of 
package breakages.  
where svf is the weight of the platform’s standalone 
value in User Utility, fPackages(t) is concave 
increasing in the Number of Market Relevant 
Packages(t), and fPackageBreakages(t) is convex 
decreasing in Package Breakage Rate(t).  
 
Platform Core Functionality is the third state variable 
in the model. It represents the current technological 
capabilities and resources that the platform offers to 
developers. The platform’s core functionality 
becomes obsolete over time, the rate of which is 
determined by market dynamism, similar to Packages 
losing relevance(t). The core functionality increases 
with planned platform updates. For simplicity, we 
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over time, instead of jumps in functionality at the 
times of platform releases. Increase in core 
functionality(t) is 1) inversely related to the Release 
Cycle Time, which is exogenous, 2) linearly 
increasing in Extent of Platform Update, which is 
also exogenous, and finally 3) capped such that 
Platform Core Functionality(t) does not go beyond 




An important contribution of our study is analyzing 
the effect of platform updates and exogenous code 
usage on package breakages. As highlighted in 
assumptions, package breakage rate is higher when 
platform updates are frequent, when more packages 
rely on other packages for functionality, and when 






where fRCT is a convex decreasing function of the 
platform’s Release Cycle Time, which is a constant in 
the model, fAvgExogenousCodebase(t)  is a linear 
increasing function of the average % of exogenous 
codebases used in packages(t), and fExtentOfUpdates 
is a linear increasing function of Extent of Updates. 
 Note that average % of exogenous codebases 
used in packages(t) is an increasing function of 
Number of Market Relevant Packages(t) since the 
higher availability of market relevant packages 
makes it easier for a developer to find relevant 
exogenous codebases to incorporate in a new 
package. Further, as the average % of exogenous 
codebases used in packages(t) increases, Package 
Development Cost(t) decreases. Finally, note that 
Package Maintenance Cost(t) is an increasing 
function of Package Breakage Rate(t), which means 
that the maintenance cost increases with Release 
Cycle Time and average % of exogenous codebases 
used in packages(t).  
4. Findings 
 
We now delve into the findings of the model. 
 
4.1. Effect of platform version release cycle 
time (RCT) for package availability and 
downloads 
 
In general, over time, the number of packages 
available and the number of downloads increase. 
However, the impact of platform release cycle time 
(RCT) on the number of downloads and packages 
available is not monotonic. In this simulation 
(Figures 3a-b), an RCT of 18 weeks appears to have 
the best impact on the number of packages and 
downloads. This underscores the tradeoffs associated 
with platform release cycle: The costs of developing 
and maintaining packages outweigh the benefits of 
improved platform functionality when RCT is short, 
but too long an RCT, the loss of benefits associated 
with platform updates outweigh the costs.  
Note that an RCT that performs well in the short 
term may not be ideal in the long term. Figures 3a-b 
shows that initially an RCT of 12 weeks has a better 
impact on the number of packages and downloads 
than an RCT of 18 weeks. However, in the long run, 
the order is reversed. This is because of the shifting 
dominance of the feedback loops. Shorter RCT 
results in a higher platform core functionality, which 
has a dominant effect on the platform’s performance 
in the short run. However, over time, the platform’s 
core functionality reaches an equilibrium and the 
advantage of a shorter RCT weakens. Instead, the 
negative effect of a shorter RCT on maintenance cost 
becomes the dominant effect, making a higher RCT 
better for the platform performance in the long run. 
 
 















Figure 3b. Effect of RCT on the number of downloads 
 
4.2. Moderating factors: Effect of Market 
dynamism, value of platform functionality 
and sensitivity of app breakages 
  
 The platform release cycle is not the only factor 
affecting the number of packages offered and the 
number of downloads. In the following section, we 
conduct sensitivity analyses on several parameters. 
 
4.2.1. Effect of market dynamism on downloads 
and number of market relevant packages We find 
that in highly dynamic markets, shorter RCTs are 
typically preferred to longer ones. This need for 
faster RCT is in line with Agile development 
principles, which recommends rapid release cycles 
for better market validation [4]. Shorter release 
cycles helps firms understand market needs, which is 
particularly important when market needs change 
quickly in dynamic markets [5]. However, our model 
shows that even in markets with high dynamism, it is 
not guaranteed that the shortest RCT will yield the 
best performance.  
Figure 4a. High market dynamism 
Figure 4b. Low market dynamism 
 
In Figure 4a, we see that an RCT of 6 weeks does not 
perform as well as an RCT of 12 weeks. This is due 
to the aforementioned adverse effects of rapid 
versioning on developers and users. Conversely, 
longer RCTs are preferred in less dynamic markets as 
the disutility from app breakage outweighs any 
benefits from increases in functionalities from more 
frequent platform updates. 
 
4.2.2. Effect of developers’ sensitivity to platform 
core functionality Next, we examine if the value of 
platform core functionality for developers can affect 
the need for radical and rapid updates. We find that if 
the platform’s core functionality is of critical value to 
the developers, then, in general, a shorter release 
cycle time would improve the number of packages 
available for download; because with more frequent 
updates, the platform’s core functionality tends to be 
higher at equilibrium (Figure 5a). The reverse is also 
true: If the platform’s core functionality is not of 
significant value to the developers, then generally 
infrequent versioning is preferred, as the costs of 
package updates to developers outweigh the benefits 
from improved core functionality (Figure 5b). Note 
that the scope of updates as well as the degree of 
market dynamism also play a role in these dynamics, 
as we discuss next.  
 




Figure 5b. Low developer sensitivity to the platform’s 
core functionality 
 
4.2.3. Relationship between scope, frequency of 
platform versions, market dynamism, and value of 
platform functionality  Dynamic markets may lead 
to greater obsolescence of platform and application 
functionality, we wondered if the platform owners 
needed to compensate for this obsolescence with 
more radical updates. This creates an interesting 
tension, as more radical updates can create more 
functionality but also more breakages, particularly if 
updates were happening frequently.  
 
 
Figure 6a: Effect of market dynamism (md) and extent of 
updates (EU) on number of market relevant packages 
(RCT = 18 weeks, low developer sensitivity to platform 
core functionality) 
Fig
ure 6b: Effect of market dynamism (md) and extent of 
updates (EU) on number of downloads (RCT = 18 weeks, 
low developer sensitivity to platform core functionality) 
Conversely, incremental updates will lead to 
lower breakages and incremental improvements in 
functionality. The frequency of updates may be able 
to compensate for the lower levels of improvement in 
functionality in the latter context.  
In Figures 6a-b, we examine a case where the 
importance of the platform core functionality for 
developers is relatively low. We see that smaller 
updates outperform bigger updates regardless of 
market dynamism. Despite the high dynamism (green 
line) in the market, smaller updates are better in this 
case, as they reduce the rate of package breakages 
and developers do not place a high value on platform 
core functionality. Our sensitivity analysis shows that 
this effect still holds for different values of RCT. 
We then examine whether radical updates are 
preferred for critical platform core functionality 
(Figures 7a-c). We find that this is true in highly 
dynamic markets (grey line in Figures 7a-c), as long 
as user and developer disutility from breakages are 
not prohibitively high. In a dynamic market, platform 
core functionality becomes obsolete at a faster rate. 
When developers greatly value platform core 
functionality, bigger updates are preferred since they 
compensate for this high rate of obsolescence. With 
lower market dynamism, however, incremental 
updates (low EU) are still preferred (red line). 
Finally, we test if the positive relationship 
between scope of update and platform outcomes in 
dynamic markets observed in Figures 7a-b holds true 
for different RCTs. Our sensitivity analysis shows 
that while the relationship still holds for long RCTs, 
the combination of radical updates and short RCTs 
results in inferior platform outcomes. Comparing 
Figures 7b (RCT=18) and 7c (RCT=6), even with a 
high value of platform functionality, frequent and 
incremental updates still lead to more total 
downloads in dynamic markets (green line). 
 
 
Figure 7a. Effect of market dynamism (md) and extent of 
updates (EU) on number of market relevant packages 





Figure 7b Effect of market dynamism (md) and extent of 
updates (EU) on number of downloads (RCT=18 weeks, 
high developer sensitivity to platform core functionality) 
 
 
Figure 7c Effect of market dynamism (md) and extent of 
updates (EU) on number of downloads (RCT=6 weeks, 
high developer sensitivity to platform core functionality) 
 
5. Discussion and implications 
 
In this paper, we examine the implications of 
platform versioning by simulating the conditions 
under which different frequencies and scopes of 
platform updates can benefit or hurt platform owners. 
Previous literature has mostly focused on governance 
mechanisms, such as control vs. functionality as well 
as pricing and the provision of platform resources 
(e.g. [13]). Little has been done to study how 
platform versioning choices can create tradeoffs for 
platform owners because of the direct and indirect 
effects on third-party developers and users. Like 
Song et al. [21], we show how frequent platform 
versioning can be disruptive to third-party 
developers’ app design process and app releases. We 
extend this by examining the interaction of scope and 
frequency of platform versioning and find that the 
effects are contingent on factors, such as the 
developers’ sensitivity to the platform’s core 
functionality and the sensitivity of package breakage 
rate.  
Overall, our findings support conventional 
wisdom with respect to shorter release cycles in the 
Agile development literature in dynamic markets. 
Shorter cycles can improve package availability and 
downloads but too short a release cycle creates 
disutility from package breakages that harm the users 
and developers and consequently, the platform 
owners. Shorter release cycle times enable platform 
owners to get more frequent feedback and the 
opportunity to try more options that could potentially 
reduce the likelihood of developing the wrong 
functionalities.  This is not the case in markets with 
lower dynamism with more stable user needs.  
However, the shorter RCT is beneficial only if 
the platform owner reacts incrementally rather than 
radically to the additional market signals gained from 
short release cycles, even in dynamic markets. We 
suggest that this implies the need for incremental 
evolution of the platform over time, because of the 
interdependencies between the platform owners, 
developers and users that need to be managed. 
Stability is needed to encourage continued use of the 
product. Frequent changes may be detrimental to the 
long term growth of the developers and cause app 
fatigue amongst developers and users alike given 
constant app breakage and release of new apps.  
Together, these findings suggest that the platform 
versioning decisions can be further optimized based 
on market dynamism. These results provide a more 
nuanced understanding of how the platform’s update 
frequency and scope may affect developers and 
owners, thus providing more insight into the 
mechanisms underlying the conflicting effects of 
platform versioning on package performance (e.g. 
[1]).  
 
6.0 Limitations  
 
This model offers a stylised view of the dynamics 
of platform versioning. While these findings are all 
intriguing, there is still a great deal of research that 
must be done to further examine the interactions and 
mechanisms. As with any simulation model, many 
assumptions had to be made in terms of functional 
forms and underlying mechanisms. For instance, in 
this version we did not distinguish between the types 
of platform updates and their effect on app breakage 
and platform outcomes. We are collecting data from 
platforms to test these assumptions and conduct 
further computational experiments as part of the 
model validation process following standard 
procedures in the system dynamics literature [2]. Our 
subsequent computational tests will examine the 
impact of platform versioning on other aspects such 
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as the effect of package development and 
maintenance costs. Future extensions of the model 
will incorporate the platform owner’s decision-
making about the timing and scope of platform 
updates.  
 
7.0 Implications for practice 
 
 This paper was motivated by our desire to 
understand the impact of platform versioning (speed 
and scope) for the different stakeholders in the 
ecosystem. Our findings offer guidance on the 
frequency of platform updates and ways to support to 
third-party app developers during platform 
versioning. We suggest that platforms should create 
smaller, but more frequent updates to reduce the 
extent of breakage, while providing improvements in 
functionality incrementally.  This may reduce the 
negative impacts outlined earlier and sustain the 
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